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INTRODUCTION
During the l ast three decades , there has been a significant
growth in t he outdoo r rec reatio n industry .

In 1969, the re were 17.6

million vis its to national parks , and by 1978, that number had
increased to 283 .1 million (Gregory, 1972;
1979) .

u.s.

Dept. of Comme rce ,

Simila rly, visits to national forests grew from 5 million in

1925 to over 147 mi ll ion in 1965 (Clawson and Knetsch , 1966).
There are many factors that would account for such a strong,
steady increase in outdoor recreation participation .

One of the most

obvious reasons 1·1ould be the post - \,orld War II "baby boom".

Such a

l arge increase in the U. S. populatio n has undoubtedly increased the
number of recreators.

Increasing worker pr oductivity has not only pro-

vided additiona l disposable income, but has also provided more leisure
time.

Thus, individuals may work less and have more money and time

with 1vhich to recreate .

A more subtle factor may be that increasing

urbanization has raised levels of psychological and emotional stress
which in turn ha s created a demand for outdoor experiences as a means
of "getting away from it all" . (Clawso n and Knetsch , 1966).
Despite rec ent increases in wilderness acreage (providing a
defacto increase in outdoor recreation acreage) , the growth in acreage
has not kept pace with the growth in demand .

It is primarily land

that is used to produce outdoor recreation services.

From 1950 to

1978, total national park acreage increased only 36% while na tional
forest acreage has remained relatively unchanged for some time .
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It is now clear that the demand for outdoor recreation has grown
faster than its supply, or more correctly, the resources that produce
its supply .

This imbalance wou l d not pose too great a problem if the

scarce resources used to produce outdoor recreation services were all ocated efficiently by some type of mechanism.

In an economy such as

ours this would imply the use of a market-type allocation scheme with
prices as the rationing agent.

However, outdoor recreation services

are typically provided by the public sector at low, or zero, cost to all
consume rs.

To many, outdoor recreation is considered a merit good and

as such should be provided freel y to all those wishing to consume it.
The lack of a market for outdoor recreation services creates some
al l ocation problems .

On the supply side, without market pricing, it

is difficult for producers to determine the values placed on these services by individuals.

Hence, it is hard to determine if economi cally

efficient quantities of resources have been devoted to producing
various recreation services.
On the demand side, an artifically low, or zero, price usually
results in over consumption (i.e ., quantity demanded exceeds quantity
supplied) of a resource, or the services it provides.

For outdoor

recreation, overcons umpti on is most noticible when there is congestion
at a recreation site .
Defined for outdoor recreation, congestion occurs when the addition of one more individual at a recreation site results in a decrease
in utility for those already at that site.

When congestion occ urs and

to what extent it affects an individual's experiences depends on the
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site .

For example, one would be more apt to experience high visita-

tion at a national park than at a wilderness area .

However , the

utility loss suffered by consumers of wilderness areas who face even
small amounts of congestion may be greater than the utility loss of
a national park consumer facing congestion.

This is due to the basic

differences in expectations that each consumer places on a specific
site, and/ or activity .
Congestion is not only a function of numbers of people.

There

are increasing numbers of different types of recreators such as;
hikers , skiers, and bi rd watchers. Conflict between two or more different user groups has increased with th e growth of outdoor recreation
dema nd.

Birdwatchers may be "disturbed" by hikers, cross-country

skiers may be "bothered" by snowmobilers, or vice-versa, and so on.
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NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
As a (quasi) public good, outdoor recreation resources are not
rationed by prices , as are private goods .

The demand fo r outdoor

recreation has grown to the point where congestion encounters are
commonplace .

In order that they may provide a quality recreation

experience to individuals resource managers should know the extent
of the the congestion costs which consumers suffer . Only then will
managers be able to achieve congestion reduction and/or prevention
through the development of a pricing scheme, increasing the resources
devoted to outdoor recreation, or a combination prices and resources
increases.
This study examined the congestion/conflict problem in Logan
Canyon, Utah .

In this recreation area there appears to be consider-

able antagonism between cross-country skiers and snow- machine riders.
Those of the former group continual l y express (publicly) their
dissatisfaction with having to recreate near or along side
snowmobilers.

The latter group feels that as taxpayers, they should

be free to recreate wherever they wish .
This study had two objectives:
1.

To examine any conflict between cross- country skie r s and
snowmobile r s in the Logan Canyon Recreation Area (LCRA).

2.

To test the relative merits of travel - cost and bid game
methodologies as suitable methods for estimating
congestion impacts.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Travel cost methodo logy
Much of the early research on outdoor recreation benefit estimation was developed by Marion Cl awson.

He is gene rally credited with

being the first to use the trave l costs to a recreation site as pr ice
proxies in the estimation of demand curves for recreation resources
(Clawson, 1959) .
Clawson ' s procedure for estimating a dema nd curve involves a two
stage process . First, data on travel costs are gath ered, usually
th rough a survey, for different distance zones from the site .
costs are then regressed against levels of use.

These

The resulting func-

tion is what Clawson calls •. "a demand curve for the entire recreation
experience ." Included in this curve, in additio n to site specific
benefits, are any benefits gene r ated by the jointly consumed variables
such as travel itself, food, and lodging.
To isolate the site specific dema nd curve requires one more step.
Using the function obtained i n stage one, which assumed nominal or
zero entry fees and similar uti 1ity functions for "average" users for
each zone, cha nges in use rates can be extrapolated from the functions
for hypothesized entry fees which yield a demand curve for the
specific recreation opportunity.
Several assumptions are made when using the Clawson app roach .
Income, tastes, and the marginal uti li ty of income for all users are
all assumed to be constant.

Individuals are also assumed to respond

to a change in travel or entry costs in the same manner as any other
price change .

They may consume more or less recreation as prices vary,
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rather than seek political redress.

Finally, time costs for indivi-

duals from different distance zones are considered insignificant, as
are congestion levels for the sites where the estimations are made .
Trave l cost valuation schemes have proved to be popular due to
their simplicity. Such methods have also been subject to considerable
research aimed at exposing their strengths and weaknesses, both
empirical and theoretical .
Cesa rio and Knetsch (1970} questioned the assumption of constant
time costs between distance zones .

They felt that ignoring time costs

differentia l s generates a downward bias in the demand function .

To

avoid this , they suggested the use of a time cost tradeoff function
to correct the demand curve. However, they also recognized the high
degree of correlation between time and distance, which makes the
esti mation of a tradeoff function more art than science, given current
statistica l procedures.

They warned that a corrected dema nd curve may

be no more accurate than the original.
Sinden (1974} also objects to treating time costs as constant .
Furthermore, he argues, bias is generated when tastes and an indivi dual's marginal utility of income are assumed to be unchanging.
Si nden recommends empirically estimating individuals' utility functions using estimated indifference curves . This method can all ow for
changes in time costs, tastes, etc •••

Demand curves can then be

derived from the utility functio ns .
Conges tion is another problem affecting the estimation of outdoo r
recreation demand curves .

The increase in congestion encounters has

piqued researchers' curiosity as to how congestion impacts affect

benefits accruing to recreation sites and has been the subject of
extensive study.

Part of this research has examined the effects of

congestion when using travel cost methods of benefit estimation.
McConnel l and Duff (1976) have devP.loped a Model which indicates
that under conditions of excess demand, travel cost methods
underestimate the benefits accuring to the site by using standard
utility maximazation procedures and incorporating travel costs into
the recreators budget constraint the appropriate demand curve can be
generated:

where;
X1

the number of trips to the site

X2

all other goods

t(d)

round trip travel and transfer costs
for a trip of leng t h d.

Px1

entrance price of site, if any

Px2

composite price for all other goods
money income

Maximizing L with respect to X1 yie lds the first order condition:

This first order condition imp l ies an ordinary, per capita demand
curve for X1 of the form:
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where the income argument is dropped for convenience.
The benefits accruing to any individual that is r1 miles from the
site can be found by calculating the individual's consumer surplus:

CSi
Note that P -t(r) is the maximum amount a recreator will pay in fees
and travel costs (i.e., the intercept of the demand curve on the price
axis) .
Estimating total site benefits requires the aggregation of all
recreators' consumer's surplus (CSi) across distance zones:
r
P-t(r )
f o L(rlf 0
f[P+t(r)]dpdr
where;
L(r)

=

population density at distance r

Since the equation for total co nsumer surplus (benefits) for the
site is a monotonic transform of individual consumer surplus, anything
that underestimates individual CS will underestimate aggregate CS.
The development of the above expression for total site benefits
requires three simplifying assumptio ns:
1)

Tastes do not vary with distance from the site.

2)

No utility is derived from travel or transfer spending .

3)

Individual's react identically to changes in t(r) or Px1.

McConnell and Duff show that congestion causes behavior that
violates assumption number 3 and hence, results in an underestimation
of site benefits.
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If it is assumed that recreation managers will limit site use
when visitation exceeds some level, K, then individual's will not be
certain as to their likelihood of admittance .

Thus, their consumption

decisio ns are based upon perceived demand (X*), not actual demand.
The recreator still faces travel and entrance costs, and the additiona! uncertainty with respect to entry .

The problem becomes:

where;
,z

the probability of the recreator ga1mng entry
based on perceived excess dema nd.

All other variables are defined as befo re.

The resulting first order

condition is:

which implies a demand function of the form:

All that needs to be examined is the change in demand result ing
from a change in either travel or entrance costs.
1)

ilnX1fdt(d)

2)

anX1/ilPx1

1

f [t(d)/" + PxtJ/"

=
=

l

[t(d)f>l + Px1J

Clearl y, there is a differen ce between these
(1) shows this difference graphically.
given by equations 1 and 2 respectively.

t1~o

expressions.

Figure

The slopes of d1 and d2 are
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x*
Fig . 1.

Divergence of Recreation Demand curve slopes under
conditions of excess dema nd.

Curve d1 is more ela stic due to the uncertainty of being admitted .
When travel costs increase, recreators reduce consumption partly
because price went up and part ly because they may not be adm i tted . The
demand curve estimated using the trave l costs methods is d1.

There-

fore, when congestion is present at a site, benefits will be underestimated when using trave l cost methods .

McCo nnell and Duff suggest that

the demand functio n should be corrected by a factor of •I.
It should be noted that McCon nel l and Duff's model applies only to
control led access recrea tion areas such as Ye ll owstone Natio nal Pa rk.
Open access areas must be examined using other mod el s (see Cicchetti
and Smith, 1973}.
Wetze l (1977) has also shown that congest i on will cause a downward
bias in trave l - cost demand curves, but for reasons different from those
of McCo nnell and Duff .

Wetze l objects to holding congest ion le vels

constant when estimating demand curves .
sentation of the Wetzel model .

The following is a brief pre-
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Fig. 2.

X,

X,

Loss of welfare due to
a price increase.

Fig . 3.

Gain in welfare due to a
price induced congestion
decrease.

Figures 2 and 3 represent typical site demand curves estimated
with travel cost techniques.

Travel costs are assumed to vary only

with distance, hence the term price refers to entry fees .

In figure

2, a rise in price from P0 to P1 will cause use of the facility to
0

decrease from X to X1
P0 AS .

1
•

Before the price change, site benefits v1ere

The price rise results in a decrease in benefits equal to the

area CAB, leaving total site benefits of P0 CBS .

Thus, Wetzel points

out , the assumptio n of constant congestion levels necessitates a loss
of social we lfare whenever the re is a price increase.
Fig. 3 il lus trates the case of variable levels of congestion.

If

th e price of entering a recreation area rises from P0 to P1, recreators
will move along S from A to B.

This decrease in consumption implies

that congestion has also l essened somewhat .

A decrease in congestion

will causeS to shift outward to S' and so co nsumption will be at B' .
The remaining consumers will consume more with a congestion decrease.
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The increase in benefits is given by the area SS'BJ and the social
l oss due to a price increase is AJJ.

In this case, a net loss in

soc ial benefits will occur only if AIJ exceeds SS ' BJ and there is no
approp riate reason why it would (or would not).

Repeated app l ica-

tions of the abov e procedure will trace out a new demand curve, DCA·
Embodied in this curve are the effects that different congestion
levels have on use rates.

Freeman {1976) calls this type of curve a

congestion-adjusted demand curve.

The congestion adjusted curve is

less elastic tha n a standard travel cost curve, generating an underestimation of site benefits when congestion levels are held constant.
Wetzel asserts that there are two effects that must be taken
into consideration when estimating site benefits:

(1) McConnell and

Duff's effect resulting from the possibi lity of exclusion, and {2)
the price induced effect postu lated by Wetzel .

Both effects result

i n underestimated site benefits.
In response to the t heoretical and empirical problems associated
with travel -cost methods in general, and congestion impacts in particular, Pajooyan, {1978) as well as Oeyak and Smith {1978) have constructed analytical models for outdoor recreation using Becker's (1971)
household production function {HPF) theory.

HPF mode l s of consumer

behavior treat individuals differently than conventional methods .
Instead of being consumers of final goods and services, households
are assumed to purchase intermediate products and combine them with
various time inputs to pr oduce commodities for final consumption .
The implications of HPF theory as applied to outdoor recreation
are twofo ld; (1) demand cur ve s can be estimated using obse rved data
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rather than possibly biased data, and (2) the implicit prices (values)
fo r recreation and congestion ca n be determined.

These values can be

shown to be the marginal costs of producing a recreation commodity and
a congestion reduction commodity, respectively.

The Pajooyan model is

presented below.
Recreationists are assumed to have utility functions of the form,

U

~(R,C,Z)

where;
R

the recreation commodity produced by
households.

C

a congestion reduction commodity.

Z

all other goods.

and,

au

31(

>

0

;

au >

R"

0

au >

rr

0

When individuals encounter congestion at a site, they are assumed
to produce C by combining variables such as time, gasoline , and car
se rv ices, in order to reduce the effects of the congestion, that is
they recreate at some other site or at another section of the initial
site.
Si nce R, C, and Z are assumed to be procuded by households, their
production functions are given by
R

r( XR

TR)

C

c(Xc

Tel

Z

z(Xz

Tz)
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where;
X;

goods and services requ i red to produce i, i = R,C,Z.

T;

time inputs necessary to produce i, i = R,C,Z.

The arg uments of the recreator's dema nd function are defined
through utility maximization.

Since commodity prices are not obser-

vable , a two-stage procedure is used; stage one yields the recreators
budget constraint, and in stage two utility is maximized
subject to the generated budget constraint.
Stage one
For any household (or individual), a cost minimization problem
can be written as:
3

3

~1

MINIMIZE

Pxi Xi + W ,·k1 T1·
V(X,T) - V

S.T.

0

where;
Px; = the market price of input X;

R,C,Z

W = wage rate
X

goods input vector = .[XR,Xc,Xz]

T

time input vector= [TR,Tc,Tz]

V

produced commodity vector = [R,C,Z]

The first order conditions are
Px; - A Vx; = 0

R,C,Z

W

R,C,Z

- A T;

V(X, T}-V = 0

0
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The first order co nditions imply the following demand curves for X;
and T;.
;
X (Px; ;W;V;)

X;

;
T; = t (W;Px; ;V ;)

Substituting X; and T; into the origi nal cost function (assuming
no joint production) yie lds
C(Px,W,X)

=

r
c
z
C (PxR.W,R) +C (Pxc.W,C) + C (Pxz,W,Z)

The implicit, or shadow, prices of R,C ,Z are given by their
marginal costs

ac

ac r

ac

ace

ac

acz

"R

MCR

= aR = aR = rrr(Pxr.W,R)

"c

MCc

= 3C = ac = rrc(Pxc.W,C)

"z = MCz = az = az = rr r (Pzr,W,Z)
The budget cons traint can now be written as

where;

V

Y + T; ·W

(full income constraint)

Y = disposable income

Stage two
The individual's utility function is now maximized subject to
his/her budget constraint:
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MAXIMIZE U = u(R,C,Z)
S.T.

nR·R + nc·R + nz·Z

Y

First order conditions of the maximization are:
0

R,C,Z

where;
the marginal utility of the ith commodity,

R,C,Z

the marginal utility of income
The first order conditions generate a demand curve for recreation
that has the implicit prices of a reacreation commodity, a congestion
reduction commodity, and income as arguments.

The commodity Z can be

dropped for convenience, since it is assumed constant.
DR

d( nR, nc, 7)
d(MCR, MCc, 'n

The marginal cost arguments can be exactly specified by assuming
some form of production function (Cobb-Douglas, CES, etc) and
performing the necessary calculations.

For his empirical work,

Pajooyan assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function:
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Using an econometics procedure that was found to yield statistically consistant results, the demand function's parameters were found
to be:
_1. 38

OR

1.42

~R

_1.74
~c

_I .38

1.4 2 MCR

1.27

V
_ I . 74

MCc

I . 27

v

The "prices" of the recreation and congestion reduction commodities are to be calculated using observed data, for the purchases of
gas, food , and equipment, and time allocation.

Using these data with

an appropriate production function and cost minimizing procedure can
yield re liable est imates of the marginal costs of producing Rand C.
Also of significant interest is the fact that the HPF model
allows a determination the value which recreators place on various
levels of congestion by observing the various amounts of the conges t ion reduction commodity produced by recreators in response to congestion.

Large quantities of C would indicate overconsumption of a

particular site (or under allocation of resources to that site).
The absence of C production wo uld clearly indicate that site use
rates had not yet reached levels at which additional expense would
be incurred to avoid congestion.
Consumer surplus
An often used measure of welfare is consumer surplus (CS) .

CS

is defined to be the area under a consumer ' s demand curve, so that
increases in expenditure due to congestion will serve to shift the
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demand curve to the right (increase), and yield an increase in CS.
Conversely , recreators may reduce expenditures by decreasing the number of days devoted to recreation which would yield a decrease in CS.
To arrive at consumer surplus values it is necessary to calculate
the area beneath the demand curve between two points (prices) of
reference.

This amounts to integrating the demand between the

reference points which in this case were the recreator ' s observed
price for that trip and a ma ximum price greater than all observed
prices , i.e., the intercept of the demand curve on the price axis CS
is def i ned as:

where:
D(P 1! 0 ) =a recreator's demand curve as a
function of prices and current income
P1

observed price

P0

ma ximum pri ce

Contingency-valuation methodology
In contrast with travel-cost valuation models, which yield
indirect estimates of the benefits individual's receive from a good
or service , contingency valuation (bid-game) methods involve direct
estimates of consumers' willingness-to-pay for a goon or service by
the individuals themselves.

The use of contengency valuation , or

bid-game, techniques usually entails creating a hypothetical situation designed to elicit personal estimates of willingness-to-pay or
willingness-to- be-compensated for a change in the provision of a good
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or service.

Whether payment or compensation quantities are desired

depe nds on initial property right assi gnmen ts .

To summarize, when

contingency valuation methods are used to elicit willingness-to-pay
responses , what is sought is the amount of money income an individual
is willing to give up in order to prevent (or achieve) a utility
decrease (i ncrease) .
It is apparent that conti ngency valuation methodology relies on
a subjective assessment of valu e by individuals .

This fact gives rise

to se ver al problems, bo th theoretical and empirical .

There has been

considerable co nt ro versy as to whether bid-game responses are based
on equivalent variation (EV) or compe nsating variation (CV).
An i ndi vi dual's bid can be defined as:

and

where :
v(P; I)

e(P;v(P;I))

the indirect utility function exp ressing
an individual's utility level at prices
P and income I.
a function relating expenditures necessary
to maintain util ity v(P;I) at prices P.

The expenditure necessary to maintain the utility level given by
v(P;Il at prices P and (money) income 10 is ! 0 • Hence, equations 1)
an d 2) above can be rewr itten as:
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A Hick's compensated demand curve (for any good or service) is:
a e(P;v(P;I))
p

d

this implies:
P!

EV,

J

P0

oe(P;v(PJ;lo))
d

p

dP

and

cv,

P!

J

Po

•e(P ;v(Po;Io))
J P

dP

Freeman (1976) has shown that for an environmental quality
variable, Q, the marginal willingness-to- pay for a change (increase)
in Q is give n by:

w; _ oe(P;Q;u)
J Q

this implies:
EV ,

J

Ql
Qo

and

where:

i:ie(PU ;Q;ul)
" Q

dQ
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There is a clear, theoretical difference between EV and CV based
res ponses, but Willig (1976) has shown that when a commodity
consumes only a small part of the individual's budget and the income
elasticity is small, EV approximates CV .

Specif icall y the rela tion -

ship is:

cs
~1here:

~

income elasticity of demand

CS

consumer surplus for the ordinary
demand curve
inc ome

now that , since CS falls between EV and CV, it can be used as an
estimate of either . However, a study done by Bishop and Heber lein

(1979), compared actual market transactions for goose hunting permits,
with bids and found 1~illingness - to-pay bids significantly lower and
willingness-to-sell bids much higher than the market surplusses . They
suggest using willingness-to- pay (EV) bidsas a lower bound and
willingness-to- sell (CV) bids as an upper bound on value .
The nature of bid-game methodology raises the questio n of
strategic behavio r, or purposeful bias .

Due and Friedlaender (1977)

recognize two obvious ince ntives for i ndividuals to distort their
answers .

The hypothetical nat ure of the bid-game usually mea ns that

no payment is required .

Individuals are given the incentive to bid

according to what they would like to see done, not how they might
behave in the market place.

The converse of this possibi l ity is also
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true .

The chance that a large enough bid may increase current use

costs provides amp le i nc entive for downward bias.
Brooks hire, et al. (1976) have shown that individuals may attempt
to impose their "true" bid on all ot her respondents by trying to shi ft
the mea n bid upward or downward, depending on the situation. For the
case of envi r onmental improvement, a strategically behaving "environmentalist" would bid high while a strategically behaving "non- environmentalist" would bid lm;, even if their respective true willingness-topay or sell were similar.
In co ntrast to Bishop and Heberlein, Brookshire, et al. (1976)
feel that zero, or near zero, bids may be more an expression of dissat isfaction with the game than strategic bidding .

Furthermore, they

argue, bias may be absent when respondents feel that their bids will
have little effect in reality.

It may be the case that when indivi-

duals have little or nothing to gain by lying, they respond accurately.
In addition to strategic behavior, Freeman (1979) cites other
pote ntial sources of bias .

The possibilities include: (1) attitudes

respondents possess toward the vehicle of payme nt, (2) innaccuracies as
a result of apathy , (3) bid start ing poi nt bias, and (4) pe r sona lity
conflicts between interviews and re spondents .
Though the reasons for viewing bid-game results with suspicio n are
valid, several studies seem to indicate that if bias is present, it may
not be significant .

Randall, et al . (1974) have found that if the

bid- game is carefu l to project credibility and realism, then bias
should not be a prob lem.

As evidence, they cite the similar ity of the

results of their study with the results of other studies examining t he
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same type of problem (valuing air quality/pollution abatement), but
using diffe re nt valuation methods.
Bohm (1972) pro vides additional credibility to bid-games by finding no significant differences between the results of five different
bid-game formats for television in Swede n.

Bo hm states that by posit-

ing several possible payment schemes and not choosing one until all
bids are collected will provide enough uncertainty regarding the game
and outcome to prevent simple strategic behavior .
The usual procedure in contingency valuation methodology is to
coll ect bids , aggregate them into a socia l willingness-to- pay function
and use this function to measure the socia l welfare surrounding the
proposed change(s).

This requires interpersonal compa ri sons of uti l ity

between respondents (Sinden, 1974) .

Such comparisons are more art than

science and can produce innaccurate results.

Furthermore, the aggre-

gate bid curve is dependent upon the initia l distribution of income.
However, Brookshire, et al . (1976), have shown that when income effects
and t he postulated welfare changes are small, the aggregate curve will
provide a va l id measure of socia l we lfare .
There are obviously problems using a bid-game to value a nonmarket priced resource .

This doe s not imply that such methods should

be considered worthless.

While contingency valuation techniques may

not provide exact answers, they ca n at leas t give insight and direc tion to the problem of study.

Their continued use will no doubt

generate methodological refinements that which eliminate some, if not
all, of the aforementioned problems.
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TH E Et1PIRICAL STUDY
This study included winter recreators in the Logan Canyo n
Recreation Area (LCRA).
Since a secondary data source co ntainin g information relavent to
this study does not exist, it was necessary to gather the required
information using a survey (appendix A contains a copy of the survey
questionaire).

No attempt was made to generate a random sample of

respondents due to the fact that the population of recreators is, for
the most part, unknown.

Instead, individuals were interviewed while

in the various parking sites found throughout the LCRA.
Though severa l kinds of recreation occurs in the LCRA during the
winter months, the majority of the people are engaged in either
cross-country skiing or snowmobile riding .
breakdown of the survey.

This is reflected in th·e

Two-hundred and twenty-one usable surveys

were call ected; ninety-two from snoWI'lobil er s, one-h undred-t\venty- ei ght
from cross-country skiers.

One survey eac h for a dogsledder and a

snowshoer were collected but not used in the analysis.
The survey data had four primary purposes:

1) to cursorily

examine socioeconomic characteristics of recreators, 2) to provide
information allowing the estimation of demand curves., consumers
surplus values, and Pajooyan's congestion reduction commodity for
each recreation activity, 3) to generate, via a bid game, willingnessto-pay responses regarding motorized / non-motorized recreator conflict;
4) to facilitate and compare the estimation of recreators' consumer
surplus based on travel - cost demand curves and bid games .
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Between the two groups, there were significant differences in
various socioeconomic factors.

More than one-half (5 3.9%) of the

skiers interviewed were students .
craftsmen/operato rs .

Of the remaining skiers, 38% were

More snow machine riders (30.4%) fell in the

craftsmen/operator category.

Far fewer snowmobile rs were students or

professionals (13% each).
The income distribution was also qu ite different .

Although the

mean income for both groups was approximately S17,000, income for
cross-country skie rs
levels.

1~as

concentrated i n the lower current income

Ove r three fourths (77 . 8%) of skiers ' incomes were l ess than

$15,000, with 32 . 8% receivin g less than $5,000 per year.

Most (62%)

snowmobilers had incomes in the $10,000 to $25 ,000 range .
Finally, many more snowmobilers were raising children, 73 . 9% vs .
20 . 6$ for the skier group .

It was beyond the scope of this project to

explain respondents' behavior using a socioeconomic analysis .
1~o rth

It is

noting hm;ever, that the differences between the two recreation

groups are significant, and that there was little or no crossover
between the groups .
Co nsumers ' su rplus estimation
The demand curves used in the calculation of CS values were
derived using t he Clawson technique out lined earlier .

First, a demand

curve for "the entire recreation experience" ~1as estimated by regress ing visitation rates against price (t ravel cost) .

The "general" curve

contains site benefits as well as the benefits accruing to travel,
food, lodging, etc .••

To arrive at a demand curve for the site, which
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will yield site specific CS estimates, one more step was taken.

For

the general (step-one) curve, it was assumed that price was equal to
(TC + fee) with the fee set equal to zero.
two) curve is estimated by:

The site specific (step-

(1) assuming an increase in fees imposed,

(2) substituting the non-zero fee into the recreator's demand function , (3) noting the changes in quantities of recreation demanded due
to a fee increase, and (4) regressing quantity demanded against fees.
Repeated application of this procedure will trace out a demand curve
for the site exclusion of travel, food, and miscel laneous benefits.
Survey data was found to vary little from respondent to respondent.

Thus, sufficient data points were available from every particu-

lar site in the LCRA to estimate statistica lly significant demand
curves, so the estimation was made for the LCRA as a whole.

This

procedure should not be too alarming upon closer inspection, since
the LCRA possesses a high degree of homogeneity among its recreation
areas.

In fact, many "sites" are not unique, but are simply different

entry points to a large area .

Travel costs were estimated using round

trip mile traveled multiplied by the Utah State Uinversity operating
expense for the type of .vehicle driven.
The possible effects of excluding time values were mentioned
earlier; however, since time quantities for travel to the LCRA for most
respondents are low and estimation of time values is complicated and
inexact, any bias introduced here is possibly small enough to ignore .
In order to compare CS and bids it was necessary to estimate
demand curves (functions) for each type of recreator.

Using ordinary
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least squares regression procedures yielded general recreation demand
curves of the for:

D;x

=

6. 70

+

00006 I - . 04P* (R 2
( .92)
(1.98)

3.67

+

000009
( . 46)

- .17P*
(1.8)

.04)

(R 2

.03)

(*sig nificant at the . 05 level)
where:
Dl

s
Dl X

stage-one demand (days) by snowmobilers
stage- one demand (days) by cross-country
skiers
mo ney income

p

travel and on-site costs

Durbin-Watson statements indicates no autocorrelation .

CS estimates

can be expressed as the the integral of the demand curves:

csl si

6.71 P

+

.00006 I · P - .02P 2

fp1
Po

csl xi

3.67 P + .000006 I · P - .08SP 2

/

1

Po

where:

csl si

st ep-one consumer surplus for
snowmobiler i

csl xi

step- one consumer surplus for crosscountry skier i

P1 ,P 0 =are as defined previously
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Appendi x (B) contains recreators' co nsumer surplus values for
the entire recreation experience.
snowmobilers

(~

The total cons umer surplus for

CSi) was $47,317.00.

CS/s nowmobilers) equaled $514,00.

Average consumer surplus (total

For cross-cou ntry skiers, an

average surplus of $23.00 .
In order to isolate the benefits being produced by the site
itself, a pair of step-two demand curves were estimated using their
respective step-one curves.

One should note that these step-two

curves are aggregate demand curves .

The demand curves are:

Ds

610.81

4.84P

Dx

354.23

11.63

(R 2
p2

= 96%)
(R2 = 85%)

As before, co nsumer surplus is found by integrating the demand
curves with respect to price.

For these aggregate curves however,

only one integration was performed on each curve, from Po
a maximum price.

=

o to P1

This procedure yields the total consumer surplus

being produced by the site.

The estimates of total consumer surplus

are expressed by:
610.81 P - 2.42P 2 I
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354.23 P- 5.81P 2

15

0

1

0

where:
2

CS s
2

CS x

step-two consumer surplus for snowmobilers
step-two consumer surplus for crosscountry skiers

the maximum price is $126. 00 for snowmobilers
and $15 for cross-country skiers.
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For step-two demand, total CS for snow-mobilers and cross-country
skiers was $38 ,440 and $2,696 . 00 respectively.

Average CS for

snowmobilers was approximately $4 18 .00 and $2 1. 00 for cross-country
skiers.
As was expected, there was a noticable, though not substantial,
difference between step-one and step-two CS.

This implies that for

the sites in question, most benefits are generated by the sites
themselves and not from incidental activities.

The large differences

in CS between snowmobilers and cross-cou ntry skiers was primarily due
to the costs faced by each group.
The problems noted earlier imply that demand curves CS would tend
to undervalue their respective commodities.

If this is the case, then

al l figures presented here can be viewed as lower bounds.

It is not

known how much downward bias is present if any; however, bia s would
have to be substantial to necessitate a change in the conclusions that
are to be drawn from the study.
Production of C
The Pajooyan model of recreator behavior when faced with
congestion, allows for a new method of examining congestion effects.
It is assumed that in the face of congestion recreators will combine
various inputs at their disposal and produce a "congestion reduction
commodity" in an effort to reduce the effects of congestion of their
rec reation experience .

The higher the quantity (of encounters) or

quality (intensity) of the congestion, the larger the amount of C
produced.

No C production implies no co ngestion encounters.
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It was as sumed that any recreator not recreating at hi s/ her
fa vo r ite site, or preferred site, due to congestio n at that site, is
producing some quantity of C by moving to the site currently used .
Out of the sample of 22 1 respondents, only three had chosen to
reloca t e due to congestion at their origina lly chosen site .

W
hile many

recreators were not at their favor ite site, more often than not their
choice was based on a desire for va riety or better snow condit i ons .
The calculation of t he congestion reduction commodity, C, was
straightforward .

The distance between a recreator ' s prefe rred, but

congested, site and the site actual l y used was multiplied by 2
(impl ying round trip distance) .

The resulting quantity was t hen

multiplied by the recre ato r's travel costs per mile, a function of the
type of vehic le dri ve n.
Us ing mileage figures obtained by t he survey , the three cost of
"C" produced was ca lc ulated to be:
$1.86

C1

s1.10

c2
c3

$0 . 39

Since time costs were impossible to determine and CPM can only be
considered ave rages, CJ, C2, C3 should be viev1ed as lower bounds.
However, even as a lov1er limi t, the almost total lac k of C procuction
tends to indicate a lac k of significant congestion in the LCRA.
Bid- game
The bid-game portion of the su rvey consisted of three questio ns.
Re spo ndents were told tha t the posited situations were purely
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hypothetical in an effort to reduce strategic bidding.

Respondents

were asked to answer "yes" or "no" to an i ni ti al bid amount.

Yes

responses resulted in larger and larger bids until a "no" response was
encountered.

An initial no response would result in a lowering of the

amount asked until a "yes" response was encountered.
Two questions in the survey, numbers one and three, were designed
to obtain estimates of general and site specific recreation values
respectively.

Question 1 asked how much recreators were willing to

pay to recreate at the site under current consumption .

The respondent

could either pay or move to another site with no fee.
Question 3 added the stip ul ation that all other reasonably
attainable sites were posing the same fees as the site in the bid game.
Recreators cou ld pay to use the site being consumed or move and pay
at any other site.

These questions dealt with recreation substitutes

and were part of another study.
The bid game concerned with congestion effects was contained in
question (Q2).

(Q2) attempted to assess the congestion cost complied

by the public versey regard'ing the rights of motorized vs. non-motorized recreato rs in the LCRA.

If this conflict is significant, then

members of either group should be willing to part with some of their
resources in an attempt to exclude members of the other gourp.

(Q2)

asked how much individuals were willing to pay to keep the site they
were presently using free of the other type of recreator.
Examination of the (Q2) bids (Appendix B) revealed a marked difference in the responses of the cross - country skiers and snowmobilers.
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Ro ughly seventy per-cent of the snowmobilers sampled bid zero for
"skier abatement".

Total willingness-to-pay (i.e., the sum of all

bids) was $80.96.

The average bid with excluded skiers was $0 .88,

with a standard deviation of 1.60, and variance of the average bid for
the existing atraction was $0.85, which is not statistically significantly different from the exclusion use bid to 2.56.
Responses for the skiers were more frequently non-zero and larger
in magnitude than those of the snowmobile group.
they would not pay to exclude snowmobilers.
willingness-to-pay was $254.72 .

On ly
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claimed

For this group, total

The skiers' average bid was $1 .99.

The standard deviation and variance for this group were 1.72 and 2.98
respectively.

For cross-country skiers, the average bid for the exis-

ting condition was $0.92 which was much different the the exclusive
bid.

A t-test showed difference in the mean bids ($.88, $1.99) of

each group, and the two bids by the snowmobilers to be statistically
different.

Even with the di verge nc e of bids it was surprising to

examine the bids of the skiers.

Much of the joy of cross-country

skiing is touted as being in the quiet and solitude of the outdoors.
This serenity can easily be shattered by the noise associated with
only one snow-machine.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that

skiers would be willing to pay a relatively great deal for a guaranteed uninterupted recreation experience.

However, roughly one third

of the sample refused to offer a non-zero, let alone large, bid.

Even

the non-zero bidders taking part in this study did not seem as anxious
to pay as large an amount as mig ht be expected if i ntergroup conflicts
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(congestion) are viewed as being serious.

It is clear, however, that

the results support the conclusion that co ngestion extremitities are
primarily one-way for the two groups.

Cross-country skiers perceive

the absence of snowmobilers as a sig nigicant improvement in that the
bids increases significantly.

Snowmobilers are apparently indiffer-

ent.
There were relatively large numbers of respondents from both
groups who bid zero.

Although an attemp t to ascertain whether or not

the respondent who bid zero was trul y at the margin or simply protesting their payment scheme was

~ade,

it was simply not possible to

be certain about the meaning of zero bids.

Known protest votes were

disregarded, but strategic zero voting was hard to detect.

It can

only be assumed that any strategic behavior here is insignifi cant .
The procedures used seemed to be in general agreement with
respect to co ngestion effect.

The production of the congestion

reduction commodity was infrequent and both groups tended to bi d low
or zero for the exclusio n of the other.

The co nclusi on drawn is that

co ngest ion, be it among or between these two groups, is

si~ply

not a

sig nificant problem in the LCRA.
Two observations were made regarding total consumer surplus and
the bids related to the total experience .

Willig (1976) states that

for commoditi es requiring expenditures which are a small portion of
income and possessing reasonably small incomes elasticities , consumer
surplus should approximate equivalent variation as a measure of
welfare recall that this difference is equal to

(~CS2/2I).

Consumer
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surplus values in this study were consistently higher than any of the
bids (see Appendix B) .

Si nce CS for the site was an aggregate number,

any comparison between site ge nerated CS and bids bias to be done
using total (sum) or average figures.

Regardless of the methods used

in comparison, the bids were a small fraction of CS.
The most obvious reason for the disparity between CS and bids is
the proportion of income spent in the participation of each activity.
Snowmobile riders incur relati vel y large costs in the purchase of
snowmachines, trailers, and accessories.

Since the average snowmobil-

er's income was in the lower-middle region, these high initial costs
along with the high travel and on site costs probably had an effect
of the magnitudes of the elicited bids.

While the costs involved with

activity of cross-country skiing were considerably lower, so too were
the incomes of those engaging in that activity .
tion was co ncerned solely with the bids.

The second observa-

When examined along with

an average individual demand curves (not the aggregate, site specific
curve), there was a striking similarity between the averrage bids for
each group and the intercept of their respective demand curves on the
price axis.

This results suggest that bid 9ames, which use pricing

such as entry fees , may produce not an equivalent variation measure
of welfare but rather the individuals reservation price (i.e., the
maximum price/quantity point or an individuals dema nd curve).
Further, resea rch is clearly indicated.
The results of the bid game should be examined with one additional problem kept in mind.

Several studies indicate that hypothesied
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behavior does not always correspond with actual behavior (Schuman and
Johnson (1976); Bishop and Heberlein (1976)).

Also, while this

empirical bias may often be present, Brookshire , et al . (1976) and
Cicchetti and Smith (1976) feel that it i s normally less than the bias
associated with compensating-variation based bids of welfare changes .
The general conclusion is that EV based bids should be viewed as a
l ower bound welfare change since empirical and theoretical source of
bias all tend to undervalue the item in question.
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Conclusions
The general conclusion made in light of this study is that
congestion in the LCRA has not reached a significant level.

The

implication for public policy makers is that restricting use of the
various areas in the LCRA to one activity or another is not justified
in terms of congestion.

The resources that could be used in the

implimentation and maintenence of such a policy would be better used
elsewhere.
Two significant problems have also been identified through this
study:
1)

Cons umer surplus may not be an appropriate measure of welfare
for these kinds of activities unless income elasticities and
the activities relative importance in the individuals budget
are more accurately specified.

2)

Bid game questions worded in the manner of this survey may
not provide an equivalent compensation measure of welfare
change, but rather, an i ndividuals maximum reservation price.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to evaluate t he congestion problem
in t he Log an Canyon Recreation Area using valuation techniques
developed through earlier research.

An analytical model based on

Becker's (1971) househol d production theory provided the justification for the estimation of congestion costs based on observed
recreator data.

This cost can be measured by calculating the added

cost of recreating at a site other tha n the recreator's first choice.
The contigency, or bid-game , method of valuing non-market priced
resources (and externalities) was al so utilized.
A survey was administered to cross - country sk iers and snow
machine riders in the Logan Canyon Recreatio n Area in an attempt
to examine congestion effects among, and bet1veen these two groups.
The survey was designed to obt ain information necessary for the
estimat i on of recreation demand curves, consumer surplus, and the
calculation of the congestion reduction commodity .

In addition,

a bid-game was conducted which asked cross-country skiers how much
they were 1vill to pay to exclude snowmob ilers and vice-versa.
Trav el-cost based demand curves were estimated for the recrea tor's entire recreation experience.

From these curves, one each for

snowmobilers and cross'country skiers, demand curves for the site
were estimated .

Integration procedures 1vere performed on both sets

of curves resul t ing in consumer surp lus estimates .

As expected, the

consumer surplus estimates from the site specific demand curves were
of a smaller magnitude than those from suing the general recreation
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curves.

The difference between both measures of individual welfare

seemed significant, if not substantial.

Given the tendency for travel

cost demand curves to underestimate site benefits, all co nsumer
surplus estimates were viewed as lower bounds.
Fu rther analysis of the survey results showed three (out of a
possible 221) instance s of C production.

C1, C2, and C3 were calcu-

l ate d to be $1.86, $1.10 and 50 . 39 respectively.

The exclusion of

time co sts implies that these amounts undervalue C somewhat .
Bid game results were somewhat one si ded , as was expected .
Skie rs were more willing to pay to exclude snowMobilers with 72% of
th e skiers offering non-zero bids.

The mean bid for skiers was 51.99.

Compared to a $0 .92 congested bid.

Roughly seventy-percent of the

snowmobilers sampled bid zero for the eliminati on of skiers at their
sites .

The mean bid for this group was $01.88, compared to a 50 . 85

congested bid.

The individual congested effect is indicated.

The bids were found to differ significantly from consumer surplus
estimates.

This difference implied that consumer surplus may not be

an approximation appropriate of welfare gains or losses for these
kinds of acti vities unless efforts are made to specify the relationship of these activities in the individuals budget more fully.
Also observed during this study was a tendency for the bids to be
much closer to the individuals maximum reservation than to the surplus
price.

Asking the willingness to pay in daily, or per use, terms

li kely doe s not yield a equivalent compensation measure of individual
welfare.

39

Due to infrequent, small quantities of congestion reduction
commodity production and relatively l ow bids for exclusion suggests
that exclusion policies for winter recreation activities should be
carefully reviewed in the Logan Canyon Area or perhaps elsewhere .
Downward bias was assumed to be insignificant for the bids. The
establishment through further research of an upper bound may provide
addi t ional insight on the question of bias.

Another option, alth ough

probably more costly, would be a study using the methods of Bishop
and Heberlein (1979), and Bohm (1972).

The uncertainty of outcomes

coupled with actual cash payments should be enough to eliminate any
bias from the results.
Research aimed at determining the type of questions that are
sure to elicit equivalent variation based bids is also suggested by
this study.
Finally, if consumer surplus is to be used in studies similar
to this one, a model that determines the relationship of CS and
equ i val ent variation based bids would be very useful.
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Appendix A

Time of interview
Site
---------------------\<INTER RECREATION QUESTIONNAIRE
Hi!
am collecting information for a Utah State University study on
winter sports in Logan Canyon. The results from this study can be used
for recreation plan ning by State and Federal agencies. My questionnaire will only take a few minutes. None of the information you give
us can be traced to you, and therefore is confidential. The results
come from all our interviews taken together. We are especially interested in finding out how you feel about this area (ID the area from
maps).
Sno~nnobiler --------------------Snowshoer
Cross-Country Skie r--------------Othe r --------------------------Also, get respondent to identify gene ral use area on map (if possib l e) .

Interviewe r identify if:

1.

Is this your first trip to this area?
1. Yes (if yes, go to 5)
2. No

2.

How many years have you been coming to this area?

3.

About hOI< many trips a year do you make to this area?

4.

Is this t he area you like most?
Yes (if yes, go to 6)
No (go to 5)

1.
2.

If no, to Question 1 or 4:
5.

Where is the area you like most? (Identify on map, if possible,
or ask mileage from current site) --------------·-----------(go to 8)

If yes , to Question 4:
6.

If there another area you would prefer but didn't use for some
reason?
l. Yes
2. No (go to 9)

If yes, to Question 6:

7.

Where is the area you would prefer? ( Ide ntify on map , if possible,
or ask mileage from current site) - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

8.

!.Jhy did you not go to your most preferred area?
1. Too many snowmobile r s (estimate how ma ny, if possible)

9.

2.

Too many cross- country skiers(estimate hoi'/ many, if po ssible)

3.

Regu l at1o ns at the site (specify) - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4.

Faciliti es at t he site (specify)

5.

Other (describe) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

How many in your party including you r self? - - - - - - - - - -

10 .

Is yours a family or non-family group?
1. Family (go to 12)
2. Non-family (go to 11)

11.

Do yo u share trip expenses?
Yes
2. No
1.

12 .

What type of ve hicle did you trave l in?

13 .

Where do you live?
City-- - - - - - - - - State - - - - - - - - - - Zi pcode - - - - - - - - - - (get all zips if possib l e)

14 .

How long ha ve you lived t h e r e ? - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

15.

How l ong did it take you to get her from your home?
- - - - - hrs. (to ne arest quarter hour)

16.

How many days do you expect to be at this area? (ove rn ight is
days)
days (if 1 day go to 19) ( if more t han 1 day go
to 17)

17.

Is this area the only recreation site you i ntend to visit on this
trip?
Yes (go to 19)
No
(go to 18)

1.
2.

18 .

What are the other areas you will visit for this kind of reacrea tion? (list)

19.

What expe nditu res have you made fo r this trip in addition to your
travel cost?
----------------------- fue l for on site activit i es
- - - - - - - - - - - - - food
---------------------- lodging
----------------------- other

20.

As you know, planning and deve 1opment of 1~i nter recreation areas
is a costly activity . The agencies invol ved have little idea how
people value these winter recreation areas and we are going to get
some idea of this value.
Try to place yourself in the situation I
This is a hypothetical situation, and it
pl ans for a permit to use this area . We
how you and other recreators value areas

am going to describe.
does not mean there are
are onl y interested in
of this type .

Suppose that this area were cl osed to access except by purchase of
a daily permit which would be sold to each perso n for entry and
the money used to provide for maintenance and patrol of the area
(similar to a ski resort) . If such a permit cost$'--.,-,.-----would you pay for one? If the pe rmi t cost $
? $________
What is the maximum you \~auld pay? $._________
If the area were designated for use only by (snowmobi l ers or crosscountry skiers, which ever the activity to be participated in),
would you pay$
for the permi t (same as maximum above) .
? $
? What is the maximum you
Would you pay$
would pay? $.______
Suppose that all other sites were also und er a permit system, and
that these perrmits cost $5 . 00 each. What would you be wil lin g to
pay for a permit on this site?
$
$
$ ---------If no, why would you not buy this permit? ----------------------

Finally, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about yourself, if you don't mi nd. None of this informatio n can be t raced
back to you .

21.

What kind of job do you (a head of household) have? (include
student)
Head of household: - -- - - -- - - - - -- -- - - - - Spouse , or other perso ns: - - -- -- - - - -- - - - - - -

22 .

Please indicate the number on the card corresponding to the
highest l evel of school you (or head of household) have completed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

23 .

What was you annual family income before taxes in 1979 ? (ide ntify
group)
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
24.

grade 0- 8
some high school
grade 12 (high school graduate)
some college or additional t raining
college or technical school deg ree
post graduate degree

0- $5,000
$5,000 - $10 , 000
$15,000 - $20 , 000
$20,000 - $25,000
$25,000 - $30,000
$30,000 - $40,000
above $40,000

Do you have children?

lf yes, how many in each age class?

Years of age
0
5

- 5
- 10

10 - 15
15 - 20
20 +
25 .

Do yo u have any comments you wou l d l ike to make about this area?
(Use othe r side of page for answe r. )

Thank yo u for your cooperation . This study should be completed by the
end of 1980 . If you are interested in the results, or have any questions, you can call or write Dr. John Keith, Department of Economics,
Uta h State University, Logan, Utah 84321 .

Sta rting Price

1. 00

3. 00

5. 00

10.00

20.00

. 90

2. 75

4.75

9.50

18.50

. 80

2.50

4.50

9. 00

17.00

• 70

2.25

4.25

8 .50

15.50

. 60

2. 00

4. 00

8. 00

14 . 00

.so

1. 75

3. 75

7. 50

12.50

. 40

1.50

3. 50

7. 00

11.00

. 30

1.25

3.25

6. 50

10.00

. 20

1.00

3. 00

6.00

. 10

5. 50

0

5. 00

Why would you not want to buy suc h a pass? - - - - -- - - - - - -

What is the maximum price at which yo u would be 1<illing to buy such
an annual pass?
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Appe nd ix B

46

SNOWMOBILERS
Travel Cost
24. 82
23 . 82
5.39
6.39
21.03
11.92
7. 84
43.04
13.92
12 . 92
12 . 64
18 . 43
18.82
16.70
10.16
29.41
49.60
17 . 62
31.18
17 . 62
12 . 35
18 . 43
10 . 70
18.92
18.92
23.92
16.70
15.29
13.47
11.08
2. 81
16.86
16.76
21.66
17.29
11.29
9.29
24.21
15.29
6.35
11.29
14.06
15.39
19.06
19 . 06

cs step 1
394 . 804
400.681
516.160
509.545
515.363
473.690
646 . 617
372.989
530.671
607 . 833
609.943
499.990
430 . 667
613.633
628. 777
368 . 340
334.303
539.154
476.945
471.726
506.248
533.461
553 . 075
496.705
496.705
495 . 563
511.663
555 . 678
691.093
586 . 085
609.723
510 . 578
579 . 200
478.516
575.294
548 . 939
563.016
493 . 595
555.678
621.094
584.552
599.271
589.348
529.051
529.051

81

82

83

0.0
3. 0

3.5
3. 0
0.0
0. 0
4. 0
2.0
0.0

5.0
5. 0
5.0
5.0
4. 0
4. 0
0.0

2.0
0.0
0.0

0. 0
2. 0
0. 0
0. 0

o.o
o.o

4.0
2. 0

o.o
0. 0
o.o
2. 0
o.o
o.o
0.0
0.0

o.o
7.0
1.5
0.0

o.o

1.5
5. 0
3.0

o.o
0.0
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
1.0
o.o
0.0
o.o
o.o
o.o
2. 0
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
3.0
o.o
1.0
o.o
o.o
o.o

o.o
o.o

o.o

o.o
0.0
o.o

o.o
o.o
o.o

o.o

o.o

7.0
1.5

0.0
1.5
5.0
3.0

o.o
o.o
0. 0
0. 0

o.o

0. 0
1.0
0. 0
0. 0
0. 0
0. 0
0.0
2. 0
0.0

o.o

0.0
0. 0
3.0
0. 0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0. 0

7. 0
3.0

3.0
1.5
5.0
3.0
5.0

o.o
o.o
o.o
1.0
1.0
1.0
3. 0

o.o
o.o
0.0
o.o
2.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
0. 0
2.0
1.0
3.0
5. 0
0. 0
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Travel Cost
14 . 45
16.96
18.96
17. 88
21.22
20.44
85 .1 9
15.64
5.82
16.14
7.16
22 . 84
25 . 95
127.04
39.27
18.82
58.93
53.33
15 . 25
10 . 24
127.04
22 . 19
8.37
6. 77
51.37
11.00
10.00
17 . 25
18.25
21.43
23.00
19.27
31.27
18.00
30.00
8.15
12 . 30
8.20
12.30
15.21
5.31
20.98
17.14
11.17
12 . 20
20 . 19
17.19

cs stee 1
492.359
611.637
563.062
436.416
443.783
549.490
167.867
553.182
662 . 326
703 . 336
504 .479
502.923
622 . 323
11.719
423 . 219
564.083
378 . 192
416 .579
555.964
664.093
11 . 719
475 . 032
606 . 034
580 . 980
430.311
479.570
486.000
575.589
501.199
512 . 602
501.830
494 . 365
446 . 714
536 .480
495.000
772.163
506 . 581
534 . 215
541.891
590.686
703.725
515 . 708
440.967
549 . 779
542.587
488.237
440.658

81

o.o

0. 0
0. 0
5. 0
0.0
5.0
5. 0
1.5
4.0

o.o
3.5
o.o
0.0
5.0
0. 0

o.o
0. 0
o.o
o.o
o.o
3. 0
0. 0
1.0
3.0
2. 0

o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
o.o
0.5
o.o
o.o
0.0
0.0

o.o
0.0
o.o
o.o
o.o
0.0
o.o
0.0
o.o

82

83

0. 0

o.o

o.o

0.0
5.0
0. 0
5. 0
5.0
2.0
4.0
0.0
3.5
0.0
0. 0
5.0
0.0
2.0
0.0
0.0
0. 0
0.0
3.0
0.0
1.0
3.0
2.0
0.0

o.o
o.o
0.0
o.o
o.o
o.o

0.0
0.5
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0

o.o
0.0
o.o

0.0
0.0
0.0

o.o
0.0
o.o

1.0
1.0
5. 0

o.o

5. 0
5. 0
5. 0
5.0
0.0
3. 5
0. 0
5.0
5.0
5. 0
5. 0
1.0
5. 0

o.o
1.0
3. 0
2.0
1.0
3. 0

o.o

5.0
5. 0

o.o
0.0
o.o
2.0
2. 0
2.0
1.0
0. 0
3.0
0. 0
1.0
1.0
0. 0

o.o
o.o
3.0
o.o
0.0
2.0
2. 0
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CROSS- COUNTRY SKIERS
Travel Cost
8. 68
3.10
4.20
9. 32
5.40
4.74
6. 74
6.74
6.74
5. 72
4 . 21
3.18
1.16
1.16
5.91
7.91
2.16
10.08
6. 57
6. 57
6. 82
3. 80
3. 58
3. 58
5.31
3.25
3. 25
4 . 87
3.87
5.00
5.00
9. 25
9.25
5.82
4 . 31
4.32
5.23
2. 66
2. 66
9. 70
8. 70
5.04
5.04
3.32
4.04
4.04

CS

ste~

16 . 478
28 . 558
25 . 178
13 . 568
24 .373
23 . 595
18.161
18. 161
18 . 161
24 . 318
25 .149
28 . 305
35 . 019
35 . 019
25 . 918
16 . 067
31.608
13 . 961
20 . 255
20 .255
18 . 776
28 .291
28 .986
28.986
21 . 977
29 . 063
29 . 063
24 .1 27
26 .171
22 . 850
23 . 750
15 . 848
15 . 848
24 . 892
38 . 818
25 . 753
23 . 090
29.967
30 . 972
14.122
13.496
24.533
24 . 533
27.865
25 . 657
25 .657

1

B1

B2

B3

3. 5
5. 0
0. 0

5. 0
5.0
3. 0
4. 0
4.5
1. 0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
5. 0
0. 0
4.0
3.0
2.0
5. 0
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
3. 0
1.0
0. 0
1.0
3.0
0.0
0. 0
1.0
1.5
3.0
0.0
3. 5
3.5
0.0
0.0
0. 0
2. 0
2.0
2.0
3.5
3.5
0. 0
0.0
2.0
0.0
0.0

3. 5
5.0

o.o

3. 0
1.0
2.0
2.0
1.0

o.o
3.0
o.o
0.0
3. 0
1.5
2.0
0.5

o.o

1.0
1.0

o.o
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0

o.o
o.o
0.0
0.0
3.0
0. 0
2. 0
2. 0

o.o
o.o
0.0
o.o
0.0
0.0
3.5
3.5

o.o
o.o

0.0
0.0
0.0

o.o
3.0
3. 5
1.0
2. 0
2.0
1.0
0.0
3. 0
5.0

o.o

5.0
1.5
2.0
1.0
3. 0
1.0
1.0
0.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
2.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
3. 0

o.o
2.0
2. 0
3. 0
3. 5
1.0
0. 0
1.0
1.0
3. 5
3. 5

o.o
0. 0
3. 0
3. 0
3. 0

